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Plagiarism is Not a Crime 
Brian L. Frye* 
ABSTRACT 
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are related but distinct 
concepts.  Copyright prohibits certain uses of original works of au-
thorship without permission.  Plagiarism norms prohibit copying 
certain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution.  The pre-
vailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which holds that 
copyright is justified because it is economically efficient.  This arti-
cle considers whether academic plagiarism norms are economically 
efficient.  It concludes that academic plagiarism norms prohibiting 
non-copyright infringing plagiarism are not efficient and should be 
ignored. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
”If we steal thoughts from the moderns, it will be cried down 
as plagiarism; if, from the ancients, it will be cried up as eru-
dition.”1 
”I am reminded of the man who was asked what plagiarism 
was.  He said: ‘It is plagiarism when you take something out 
of a book and use it as your own.  If you take it out of several 
books then it is research.’”2 
”As Wilson Mizner says, ‘When you take stuff from one writer 
it’s plagiarism, but when you take from many writers it’s 
called research.’”3 
”On the title page of most of the books on Art should be print-
ed, ‘If you steal from one person it’s plagiarism: if you steal 
from three persons it’s research.’”4 
”The moral is, in literature, not to steal from one author, but 
to learn from many.  Plagiarism is not only a crime, but a 
mark of stupidity, like robbing a country bank.”5 
”Asa G. Baker quotes a librarian’s distinction between plagia-
rism and research: ‘If you wrote a paper and quoted without 
credit from a single book, it would be plagiarism; but if you 
quoted from three or four, it would be research.’”6 
 
 1. CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS: ADDRESSED TO 
THOSE WHO THINK 229 (1820). 
 2. Ralph Foss, Cooperation Between Special Libraries and Publishers, in SPECIAL 
LIBRARIES 281 (1932). 
 3. FRANK CASE, TALES OF A WAYWARD INN 248 (1938). 
 4. Joseph Cummings Chase, Do You Call THAT Art?, THE COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1938, 
at 26. 
 5. WALTER S. CAMPBELL, PROFESSIONAL WRITING 88–89 (1946). 
 6. QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/09/20/plagiarism/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
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”‘If you get information from one source,’ said Leslie Henson 
in his recent London show, ‘it’s called plagiarism; if you get it 
from two or more sources, it’s called research.’”7 
”Bob Oliver suggests a simple rule-of-thumb for would-be 
movie scenarists.  ‘Just remember,’ says he, ‘if you steal from 
one man, it’s plagiarism.  If you steal from several, it’s re-
search.’”8 
”If you steal from one author, it’s plagiarism; if you steal from 
many, it’s research.”9 
”Remember why the good Lord made your eyes, 
So don’t shade your eyes, 
But plagiarize, plagiarize, plagiarize – 
Only be sure always to call it please ‘research’.”10 
”To steal ideas from one person is plagiarism.  To steal from 
many people is research.”11 
In the 1980s California of my youth, a popular bumper sticker 
proclaimed: “Skateboarding is Not a Crime.”  It was ubiquitous, 
appearing on bathroom walls, storefront windows, park benches, 
and occasionally even bumpers.  While the origin of the slogan is 
unclear, it became popular when Santa Cruz Skateboards and 
TransWorld SKATEboarding magazine passed out hundreds of 
thousands of bumper stickers, in response to a wave of municipal 
regulations prohibiting skateboarding.12 
The slogan resonated with skateboarders because it expressed 
two related but distinct ideas.  It not only observed that skate-
 
 7. Henry King, New Problems in Advertising and Steps Towards Their Solution, in 
CANADIAN MARKETING PROBLEMS: TEN ESSAYS 80 (H.R. Kemp ed., 1939). 
 8. Jimmie Fidler, Jimmie Fidler in Hollywood, March 17, 1941, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 
2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/thedailymirror/2011/03/jimmie-fidler-in-hollywood-
march-17-1941.html. 
9.Alva Johnston, Legend of a Sport–I, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 1942, at 21 (attributed to 
Wilson Mizner). 
 10. TOM LEHRER, LOBACHEVSKY (Lehrer Records 1953). 
 11.  EMERY A. WILSON ET AL., PEARLS: FOR LEADERS IN ACADEMIC MEDICINE 28 (2008) 
(attributed to Steven Wright). 
 12. See, e.g., Barbara Metzler, Cities Fed Up, ‘Making Criminals’ Out of Skateboarders, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-20/news/mn-
575_1_transworld-skateboarding (“All the bad press prompted Santa Cruz Skateboards, 
among the largest manufacturers of skateboarding equipment, and Transworld Skate-
boarding magazine to give out hundreds of thousands of bumper stickers with the message: 
‘Skateboarding Is Not a Crime.’”). 
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boarding was a prima facie lawful activity, but also implied that 
regulations prohibiting skateboarding were illegitimate because 
they merely reflected and reinforced negative social meanings as-
sociated with skateboarding.13  The literal observation that skate-
boarding was not generally prohibited reinforced the implicit as-
sertion that skateboarding should not be prohibited. 
The sociologist Howard Becker famously argued “social groups 
create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes 
deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and la-
beling them as outsiders.”14  As a consequence, deviance is a rela-
tional concept, defined only in relation to the rules created and 
enforced by various social groups: “‘[O]utsiders,’ from the point of 
view of the person who is labeled deviant, may be the people who 
make the rules he had been found guilty of breaking.”15 
For example, Becker observed that in the 1960s, mainstream 
society viewed marijuana users as “outsiders” because marijuana 
use was prohibited, but marijuana users viewed non-marijuana 
users as “outsiders” because they observed prohibitions on mariju-
ana use.16  Likewise, in the 1980s, mainstream society viewed 
skateboarders as “outsiders” because skateboarding was prohibit-
ed, but skateboarders viewed non-skateboarders as “outsiders” 
because they observed prohibitions on skateboarding.  In both cas-
es, mainstream society defined an activity as “deviant” by prohib-
iting it, thereby creating a group of “outsiders,” and the “outsid-
ers” questioned the legitimacy of the prohibition by arguing that it 
was not justified. 
But Becker’s dialectical theory of deviance is not limited to for-
mal legal rules.  Social groups routinely define certain activities as 
“deviant” by creating and enforcing social norms that prohibit 
those activities, and labeling people who engage in those activities 
as “outsiders.”17  Legal scholars have observed that stand-up co-
 
 13. Cf. William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 381 n.264 
(2013) (“This understanding of the social meaning of crime perhaps explains why some 
people assert that activities that are not crimes in fact are not crimes.”).  Ironically, while 
skateboarding is not a crime, saying so might be.  In 1998, the USPTO registered three 
trademarks for the phrase “SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME.”  See 
SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME, Registration No. 2134679 (“75286938 (clothing, 
namely, T-shirts, sweatshirts, [sweatpants, jackets,] hats, [and swimwear]”)); 
SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME, Registration No. 2134680 (“75286939 (skateboards 
and skateboard decks”)); SKATEBOARDING IS NOT A CRIME, Registration No. 2137534 
(“75286940 (decalcomanias, decals, [paper flags] and paper banners”)). 
 14. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 15. Id. at 15. 
 16. See generally id. at 41–78. 
 17. Id. at 1–4. 
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medians prohibit “joke-stealing,” roller derby skaters prohibit 
“pseudonym-stealing,” and tattoo artists prohibit “tattoo-
stealing.”18  These social norms effectively create extra-legal prop-
erty rights in jokes, pseudonyms, and tattoos. 
Likewise, many social groups define “plagiarism” as “deviant” 
by creating and enforcing social norms that prohibit copying cer-
tain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution.19  These 
plagiarism norms effectively create extra-legal “attribution rights” 
in expressions, facts, and ideas.  Different social groups have 
adopted different plagiarism norms.  Academic plagiarism norms 
create some of the most expansive “attribution rights,” by prohibit-
ing the use of any expression, fact, or idea without attribution. 
While copyright and plagiarism norms often overlap, they are 
analytically distinct and protect substantively different rights.  
Copyright prohibits certain uses of original works of authorship 
without permission, irrespective of attribution; plagiarism norms 
prohibit copying certain expressions, facts, and ideas without at-
tribution, irrespective of copyright protection.  Notably, copyright 
does not and cannot protect facts or ideas, or require their attribu-
tion, but plagiarism norms typically require the attribution of both 
facts and ideas.  As a result, copying with attribution may be cop-
yright infringement, but cannot be plagiarism, and copying with-
out attribution is plagiarism, but may not be copyright infringe-
ment. 
The prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which 
holds that copyright is justified because it solves market failures 
in works of authorship caused by free riding by giving marginal 
authors an incentive to invest in the creation of works of author-
ship.20  In other words, copyright is justified because it increases 
net social welfare: the social cost of providing copyright protection 
is exceeded by the social benefit of additional works of authorship.  
By implication, copyright is justified when it increases net social 
welfare, and not justified when it reduces net social welfare. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): 
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Come-
dy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1787–88 (2008); David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual 
Property Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012); Aaron 
Perzanowski, Tattoos and IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 541–60 (2013). 
 19.  See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 175 (2002). 
 20. See generally RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N.  HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (2013). 
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Of course, just as legal rules may or may not be justified, social 
norms also may or may not be justified.  Scholars have previously 
questioned the legitimacy of the informal property rights created 
by social norms by asking whether they are justified on welfarist 
grounds.21  Plagiarism norms effectively create an extra-legal form 
of copyright protection by giving authors a de facto “attribution 
right” in certain expressions, facts, and ideas.  Under the economic 
theory of copyright, plagiarism norms are justified if they increase 
social welfare, and are not justified if they decrease social welfare. 
This article argues that academic plagiarism norms that prohib-
it non-copyright infringing copying are not justified under the eco-
nomic theory of copyright because they require attribution even 
when it reduces public welfare.  When applied to scholars, they 
reduce public welfare by requiring inefficient attribution and cre-
ating inefficient incentives.  When applied to students, they re-
duce public welfare by prohibiting efficient pedagogical tech-
niques, including “patch writing,” or the use of imitation as a 
method of developing writing skills.22 
II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution empowers 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for 
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writ-
ings . . . .”23  The Copyright Act uses that power to give authors 
certain exclusive rights to use the original elements of their works 
of authorship for a limited period of time, subject to certain excep-
tions, including “fair use.”24 
The Intellectual Property Clause also limits the potential scope 
of copyright protection.25  It provides that Congress can only afford 
copyright protection for “limited times,” a limitation observed 
 
 21. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Who’s in the Club?: A Response to Oliar and 
Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Does Equity Pass the Laugh 
Test?: A Response to Oliar and Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 9 (2009); Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Custom, Comedy, and the Value of Dissent, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 19 (2009).  
But see Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, From Corn to Norms: How IP Entitlements 
Affect What Stand-up Comedians Create, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 57 (2009).  See also Ste-
phen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 59. 
 22. See generally REBECCA MOORE HOWARD, STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: 
PLAGIARISTS, AUTHORS, COLLABORATORS (1999). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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largely in the breach.26  But it also provides that copyright can 
only protect the “original elements” of a work of authorship, which 
must be “independently created by the author” and reflect “at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.”27  The “independent cre-
ation” requirement provides that an element of a work is original 
only if it is not a copy of something that already exists, so copy-
right cannot protect an element of a work that is copied from a 
previously existing work.28  Likewise, copyright cannot protect 
facts, because they are not created, but discovered: “The first per-
son to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he 
or she has merely discovered its existence.”29  While the “creativi-
ty” requirement provides that an element of a work is original on-
ly if it reflects a “modicum of creativity,” it is effectively meaning-
less, because the Supreme Court has not defined “creativity” or 
explained how to measure it.30 
In addition, copyright does not and cannot protect ideas.  The 
Copyright Act provides: “In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.”31  As the Supreme Court has 
observed, the “idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (reviewing Congress’s decision to 
extend the copyright term under the rational basis test); see also Brian L. Frye, Eldred & 
the New Rationality, 104 KY. L.J. ONLINE 1 n.44 (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/index.php/2015/07/17/eldred-new-rationality/#more-177 
(asking whether the Supreme Court should revisit Eldred and related cases given apparent 
changes in the rational basis test). 
 27. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 28. Id.  As Justice Holmes famously explained, “Others are free to copy the original.  
They are not free to copy the copy.”  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 249 (1903) (citing Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828).  In theory, copy-
right can protect an element of a work that is identical to an element of a pre-existing work, 
if it was not copied from the pre-existing work.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro–Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).  But in practice, most courts would assume “uncon-
scious copying.”  See, for example, Bright Tunes Music Corporation v. Harrisongs Music, 
Limited: 
Did Harrison deliberately use the music of He’s So Fine?  I do not believe he did so 
deliberately.  Nevertheless, it is clear that My Sweet Lord is the very same song as 
He’s So Fine with different words, and Harrison had access to He’s So Fine.  This is, 
under the law, infringement of copyright, and is no less so even though subconscious-
ly accomplished. 
420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 29. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347 
 30. Id. at 362. 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
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permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author’s expression.’”32 
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Copyright infringement is a tort, and intentional copyright in-
fringement for commercial purposes is a crime.33  If an original 
element of a copyrighted work is used without permission, the 
copyright owner may file an infringement action.34  In order to 
make out a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a copyright 
owner must show that the defendant actually copied one or more 
original elements of the copyrighted work, and that copying the 
original elements made the works substantially similar.35 
Copyright may also protect certain moral rights.  For example, 
the Berne Convention requires its signatories to grant authors a 
right of attribution and a right of integrity.36  The right of attribu-
tion gives authors the right to require attribution to their works of 
authorship, while the right of integrity gives authors the right to 
prevent the alteration or destruction of their works of author-
ship.37  In conjunction, the rights of attribution and integrity may 
also provide authors with the right to disclaim authorship of a 
work, under certain circumstances. 
In general, United States copyright law does not protect moral 
rights.  While the Copyright Act does provide limited rights of at-
tribution and integrity to the authors of certain works of visual 
art, these are the exception that proves the rule.38  The Copyright 
Act does not provide a general attribution right, and at least in 
theory, attribution is largely irrelevant to copyright infringe-
 
 32. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 
471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 33. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–513 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 361 (“To establish infringement, two elements must 
be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the 
work that are original.”). 
 36. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis., 
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
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ment.39  Non-attribution is not an element of an infringement ac-
tion, and attribution is not a defense to infringement action.40 
IV. PLAGIARISM 
Plagiarism is not a legal wrong.  There is no cause of action for 
plagiarism.  It is neither a tort, nor a crime.  Plagiarism is a social 
wrong, defined and enforced extra-legally by different social 
groups in different ways. 
But plagiarism is punished no less severely than copyright in-
fringement.  Indeed, the social sanctions associated with plagia-
rism are arguably even more severe than the legal sanctions asso-
ciated with copyright infringement, because they preclude expia-
tion.  “Plagiarism is considered by most writers, teachers, journal-
ists, scholars, and even members of the general public to be the 
capital intellectual crime.”41  Tortfeasors must pay damages, and 
criminals must endure punishment, but plagiarism is forever: 
“The label is the academic equivalent of the mark of Cain.”42  A 
student “convicted” of plagiarism may be expelled, and a scholar 
may be fired.  At least in theory, plagiarists may have “second 
acts” in their lives, but not in their academic careers.43 
Plagiarism is typically defined as copying without attribution.  
For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as, “The 
deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original 
ideas or creative expression as one’s own.”44  Chafee distinguished 
copyright infringement and plagiarism by observing, “In piracy, 
unlicensed persons still give the author credit; in plagiarism they 
take the credit themselves.”45 
In other words, the essence of plagiarism is misattribution, and 
plagiarism norms typically prohibit copying certain expressions 
and ideas without attribution.  And yet, there is no uniform defini-
tion of plagiarism.  As St. Onge observed, “Plagiarism shares a 
curious semantic feature with the term pornography.  Even 
 
 39. Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 2 (2005) (“In Dastar, Fox attempted to impose legal liability on Dastar for non-
attribution.  It attempted to convert plagiarism, which violates the moral standards of 
many professions and communities, into a legal violation.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
effort emphatically.”) (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23, 27, 38 (2003)).   
 40. Id. 
 41. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 107 (2007). 
 42. K. R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 61 (1988). 
 43. Cf. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE LAST TYCOON (1941). 
 44. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (8th ed. 2004). 
 45. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 513 (1945). 
142 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54 
though we cannot agree on specifics, ‘[w]e know it when we see 
it.’”46 
The meaning of the term “plagiarism” is indeterminate in part 
because it depends on social context.  Different social groups de-
fine plagiarism differently by adopting various plagiarism 
norms.47  In practice, journalistic plagiarism norms typically re-
quire the attribution of copied expressions, but do not require the 
attribution of copied facts and ideas.48  However, many plagiarism 
norms do not require the attribution of certain expressions.  For 
example, most social groups do not require the attribution of jokes 
and anecdotes.49 
The definition of the term “plagiarism” is also indeterminate be-
cause plagiarism norms typically fail to adequately define plagia-
rism.  Plagiarism norms often fail to specify exactly what they pro-
tect, how they protect it, and when they apply.  As a consequence, 
it can be difficult to determine whether particular uses of works of 
authorship require attribution.  This difficulty encourages a “cul-
ture of attribution,” or a social norm of attributing all copied ex-
pressions, facts, and ideas, whether or not attribution is helpful or 
justified.  The stronger the plagiarism norms adopted by a social 
group, the greater the incentive to attribute in all cases to avoid 
potential violations. 
A. Academic Plagiarism Norms 
In the interest of brevity and clarity, this article’s analysis will 
focus on academic plagiarism norms because they are both expan-
sive and paradigmatic.  Academic plagiarism norms typically re-
quire the attribution of expressions, facts, and ideas.  The Modern 
Language Association (“MLA”) has promulgated the following 
widely accepted definition of academic plagiarism: “Plagiarism is 
 
 46. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 51. 
 47. See, e.g., Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications 
for the University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 15–18 (2010) (“A review of the literature suggests that 
no universal understanding exists with respect to plagiarism; rather, it is a term that en-
compasses a variety of permutations that extend beyond the mere appropriation of anoth-
er’s specific language.”). 
 48. Compare NYU JOURNALISM HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS, available at 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/document-nyu-journalism-handbook-for-
students.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (defining plagiarism as the unattributed copying of 
expressions, ideas, or facts) with Trudy Lieberman, Plagiarize, Plagiarize, Plagiarize . . . 
only be sure to call it research, 34 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 21 (1995) (observing that in 
practice journalistic plagiarism norms typically only require the attribution of expressions). 
 49. But see Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 18, at 1787. 
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the use of another person’s ideas or expressions in your writing 
without acknowledging the source.”50 
The MLA plagiarism policy explicitly prohibits the unattributed 
copying of expressions and ideas, defining both terms quite broad-
ly.  Specifically, it prohibits unattributed copying of “expressions,” 
including “sentences” and “apt phrases.”51  By contrast, copyright 
law typically does not protect individual sentences, and cannot 
protect short phrases.52  In addition, the MLA policy prohibits the 
unattributed copying of “ideas,” including an “argument,” “line of 
thinking,” or “thesis.”53  By contrast, copyright law does not and 
cannot protect “ideas,” which would include all of these exam-
ples.54 
In addition, the MLA definition of plagiarism is remarkably 
vague.  Academic plagiarism norms effectively create an “attribu-
tion right” in certain expressions and ideas, but it is unclear when 
such a right exists.  When do “sentences” and “apt phrases” belong 
to someone?  What if a sentence is conventional, factual, trivial, or 
banal?  When is a phrase “apt”?  Are inapt phrases unprotected?  
Who decides whether a sentence or phrase is entitled to protec-
tion?  When does an “argument,” “line of thinking,” or “thesis” be-
long to someone?  What if it is not unique to the copied work? 
Educational institutions typically adopt plagiarism policies gov-
erning student work, which provide various definitions of plagia-
rism.  For example, the University of Kentucky’s plagiarism policy 
provides: 
All academic work, written or otherwise, submitted by stu-
dents to their instructors or other academic supervisors, is 
expected to be the result of their own thought, research, or 
 
 50. WALTER S. ACHTERT & JOSEPH GIBALDI, THE MLA STYLE MANUAL 4 (1985). The 
MLA also provides that: 
The most blatant form of plagiarism is reproducing someone else’s sentences, more or 
less verbatim, and presenting them as your own.  Other forms include repeating an-
other’s particularly apt phrase without appropriate acknowledgement, paraphrasing 
someone else’s argument as your own, introducing another’s line of thinking as your 
own development of an idea, and failing to cite the source for a borrowed thesis or 
approach. 
Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 34, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, OR SHORT PHRASES, (2015), available at 
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 53. See ACHTERT & GIBALDI, supra note 50, at 4. 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
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self-expression.  In cases where students feel unsure about a 
question of plagiarism involving their work, they are obliged 
to consult their instructors on the matter before submission. 
When students submit work purporting to be their own, but 
which in any way borrows ideas, organization, wording or an-
ything else from another source without appropriate acknowl-
edgment of the fact, the students are guilty of plagiarism. 
Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else’s work, wheth-
er it be published article, chapter of a book, a paper from a 
friend or some file, or whatever.  Plagiarism also includes the 
practice of employing or allowing another person to alter or 
revise the work which a student submits as his/her own, who-
ever that other person may be.  Students may discuss as-
signments among themselves or with an instructor or tutor, 
but when the actual work is done, it must be done by the stu-
dent, and the student alone. 
When a student’s assignment involves research in outside 
sources or information, the student must carefully 
acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she has em-
ployed them.  If the words of someone else are used, the stu-
dent must put quotation marks around the passage in ques-
tion and add an appropriate indication of its origin.  Making 
simple changes while leaving the organization, content and 
phraseology intact is plagiaristic.  However, nothing in these 
Rules shall apply to those ideas which are so generally and 
freely circulated as to be a part of the public domain.55 
The vagueness and overbreadth of this plagiarism policy is ob-
vious and impressive, and worth reviewing line by line: 
• “When students submit work purporting to be their 
own, but which in any way borrows ideas, organiza-
tion, wording or anything else from another source 
without appropriate acknowledgment of the fact, the 
students are guilty of plagiarism.”56  The policy prohib-
its students from copying “anything” without attribu-
 
 55. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY SENATE RULES, 6.3.1 PLAGIARISM (Feb. 
2012), available at 
http://www.uky.edu/Faculty/Senate/rules_regulations/Rules%20Versions/MASTER%20RUL
ES%20from%20February%202012_clean.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
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tion, which presumably includes expressions, facts, 
and ideas, no matter how generic or trivial. 
• “Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else’s work, 
whether it be published article, chapter of a book, a 
paper from a friend or some file, or whatever.”57  Pre-
sumably, this is a mistake, because it appears to pro-
hibit copying with attribution, which is typically not 
considered plagiarism. 
• “Plagiarism also includes the practice of employing or 
allowing another person to alter or revise the work 
which a student submits as his/her own, whoever that 
other person may be.  Students may discuss assign-
ments among themselves or with an instructor or tu-
tor, but when the actual work is done, it must be done 
by the student, and the student alone.”58  Apparently, 
students may discuss their work with professors and 
other students, but may not incorporate any advice 
they receive. 
• “When a student’s assignment involves research in 
outside sources or information, the student must care-
fully acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she 
has employed them.”59  The policy requires attribution 
of any use of “outside sources or information,” but does 
not define either term, or explain what counts as use. 
• “If the words of someone else are used, the student 
must put quotation marks around the passage in ques-
tion and add an appropriate indication of its origin.”60  
While the policy states the “words of someone else,” it 
does not explain when words belong to someone else 
and when they do not. 
• “Making simple changes while leaving the organiza-
tion, content and phraseology intact is plagiaristic.”  
The policy prohibits copying the “organization, content 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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and phraseology” of a work, without providing any def-
inition of those terms or what they might include.61 
• “However, nothing in these Rules shall apply to those 
ideas which are so generally and freely circulated as to 
be a part of the public domain.”62  The policy does not 
require attribution of “those ideas which are so gener-
ally and freely circulated as to be a part of the public 
domain,” but does not describe how to determine 
whether an idea is “in the public domain,” an especial-
ly infelicitous term in this context given that under 
copyright law, all ideas are in the public domain by 
definition.  Moreover, the policy specifically prohibits 
unattributed copying of many public domain elements, 
like facts, ideas, and organization. 
Finally, the policy helpfully advises: “In cases where students 
feel unsure about a question of plagiarism involving their work, 
they are obliged to consult their instructors on the matter before 
submission.”63  Hopefully, there are an awful lot of such consulta-
tions, because it is hard to imagine how any student attempting to 
follow this policy could possibly be anything but “unsure” about 
any “question of plagiarism.”  In any case, I am certainly confused. 
The vagueness of academic plagiarism norms is troubling be-
cause laws and social norms should not be arbitrary.  As St. Onge 
observed: “Either there are rules and laws pertaining to the term 
or the term itself is a useless, even pernicious, entity.”64  Social 
norms are, by their very nature, typically less formal and well de-
fined than laws.  However, the academic plagiarism norms govern-
ing both scholars and students were codified long ago.  It is rather 
surprising that such norms remain inchoate.65 
 
 61. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, supra note 55, at 6.3.1. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at x. 
 65. For example, Professor Steven Dutch states: 
It is certainly true that colleges and universities are seeing an epidemic of plagia-
rism, fueled by easy electronic access to resources, including “research papers.”  Back 
in the days before the Internet, students at least had to put out the effort to type out 
their stolen work by hand; now they need merely cut and paste.  It is equally true 
that we are seeing an epidemic of faulty definitions of plagiarism, including high-
profile but inaccurate and unsupportable claims of plagiarism lodged against promi-
nent authors and filmmakers.  Bad definitions of plagiarism confuse students and 
simultaneously trivialize the problem.  The examples cited in style manuals are 
commonly so pedantic that students might be pardoned if they conclude the whole is-
sue is a matter of academic nit-picking. 
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The arbitrariness of plagiarism norms has long provoked criti-
cism and satire.  As Voltaire observed: “It is chiefly in poetry that 
plagiarism is allowed to pass; and certainly, of all larcenies, it is 
that which is least dangerous to society.”66  Many have noted the 
formidable risk of hypocrisy, given that many complainants have 
themselves copied without attribution.  The notable satirist Am-
brose Bierce defined plagiarism as, “[a] literary coincidence com-
pounded of a discreditable priority and an honorable subse-
quence,” and, “[t]o take the thought or style of another writer 
whom one has never, never read.”67  And a popular online diction-
ary even uses an unattributed quip to illustrate the use of the 
term: “It is said that he plagiarized Thoreau’s plagiarism of a line 
written by Montaigne.”68 
Regardless, plagiarism norms are at least nominally observed 
and enforced, effectively creating an extra-legal attribution right 
in works of authorship by using social sanctions to punish the un-
attributed copying of expressions, facts, and ideas under certain 
circumstances.  The scope of the attribution right depends on the 
social group that creates and enforces the plagiarism norm.  In the 
case of academic plagiarism norms this right is broad indeed, ex-
tending, at least theoretically, to every expression, fact, or idea in 
a work of authorship, no matter how pedestrian. 
V. COMPARING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT & PLAGIARISM 
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are often mistakenly 
used as synonyms.  For example, journalists often refer to copy-
right infringement actions as “plagiarism” claims, probably be-
cause they are more familiar with plagiarism norms than copy-
right law.69  But judges also make this mistake, especially when 
considering copyright infringement actions that make claims on 
the fringes of copyright protection.  In one copyright infringement 
action, Sheldon v. Metro–Goldwyn Pictures Corporation,70 Judge 
 
Steven Dutch, Sense and Nonsense About Plagiarism, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-GREEN 
BAY (last updated June 2, 2010), 
https://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/PlagiarNonsense.HTM. 
 66. VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 205 (William F. Fleming trans. 1901). 
 67. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY, TALES, AND MEMOIRS 581 (S.T. Joshi 
ed., 2011). 
 68. Plagiarism Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/plagiarism (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 69. See, e.g., Lauren Moraski, Led Zeppelin loses first round in “Stairway to Heaven” 
plagiarism lawsuit, CBS NEWS, (Oct. 21, 2014 11:21 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/led-zeppelin-loses-first-round-in-stairway-to-heaven-
plagiarism-lawsuit/. 
 70. Sheldon, 81 F.2d 49. 
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Learned Hand observed “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by 
showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”71 
Copyright infringement and plagiarism do share one essential 
requirement: copying.  Without copying, there is neither copyright 
infringement, nor plagiarism.  Conflating copyright infringement 
and plagiarism, Judge Learned Hand famously observed: 
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not 
himself pro tanto an ‘author’; but if by some magic a man who 
had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a 
Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted 
it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of 
course copy Keats’s.72 
However, while copyright infringement and plagiarism often 
overlap, they are not synonymous.  Copyright infringement may 
not be plagiarism, and plagiarism may not be copyright infringe-
ment.  Reproducing—with attribution—a protected element of a 
copyrighted work can be an infringing use, but cannot be plagia-
rism.  By contrast, reproducing a public domain work and attrib-
uting it to oneself cannot be a copyright infringement, but is a 
textbook example of plagiarism.73  As David Nimmer observed: 
Copyright infringement never occurs, for instance, when one 
copies another’s idea or even a brief phrase of expression from 
a work still subject to copyright protection.  Furthermore, 
even copying the entirety of another’s public domain expres-
sion—for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s The Path of 
the Law, published in 1897—is analytically incapable of fall-
ing afoul of copyright law.  By contrast, a professor who pub-
lished under his own name all or part of The Path of the Law 
would be guilty of the most serious academic breach, poten-
tially deserving termination.  Indeed, if he purloined only an 
uncredited phrase or even idea, he would find himself culpa-
ble for plagiarism under the definition just quoted.  By the 
same token, a student who submitted to her professor a paper 
 
 71. Id. at 56.  See also Mayimba Music, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 12 Civ. 
1094(AKH), 2014 WL 5334698, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014) (“Both songs are also struc-
tured around a long verse, which are not similar.  However, plagiarism cannot be excused 
by showing that not everything has been pirated.”) (citing Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 56). 
 72. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249); Gerlach–Barklow Co. v. 
Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)). 
 73. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distribs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (observing that the Copyright Act does not create a general attribution 
right). 
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setting forth verbatim, but under her own name, paragraphs 
from The Path of the Law, would be subject to the full disci-
plinary weight that the school could bring to bear.74 
In other words, copyright infringement and plagiarism overlap, 
but are not co-extensive.  Copyright law prohibits certain unau-
thorized uses of copyrighted works, irrespective of attribution, and 
plagiarism norms prohibit unattributed copying of certain expres-
sions, facts, and ideas, irrespective of copyright protection.  Using 
an original element of a copyrighted work with attribution may be 
copyright infringement, but cannot be plagiarism, and copying a 
fact or idea without attribution may be plagiarism, but cannot be 
copyright infringement. 
 
VI. THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT 
 
A. Economic Theory 
The prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which 
holds that copyright is justified because it increases economic effi-
ciency by solving market failures in works of authorship caused by 
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free riding.75  Classical economics predicts that free riding will 
cause market failures in non-rivalrous or “public” goods because 
rational economic actors will underinvest in the production of pub-
lic goods if they cannot recover the fixed and opportunity costs of 
production.  Works of authorship are quintessential public goods 
because they are perfectly non-rivalrous; so classical economics 
predicts that free riding will cause market failures in works of au-
thorship.76 
Under the economic theory, copyright solves market failures in 
works of authorship by making them partially excludable.77  The 
exclusive rights provided by copyright enable authors to recover 
their fixed and opportunity costs, by giving them certain exclusive 
rights to use works of authorship for a certain period of time.  As a 
result, authors can internalize some of the positive externalities or 
“spillovers” generated by the creation of a work of authorship by 
charging consumers more than the marginal cost of production.78  
In other words, copyright increases economic efficiency by indi-
rectly subsidizing authors; thereby providing an incentive for 
marginal authors to invest in the production of works of author-
ship. 
The utilitarian theory resembles the economic theory, but holds 
that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare, 
which includes both economic and non-economic goods.79  Under 
the utilitarian theory, economically inefficient copyright protection 
is justified if it causes the production of non-economic goods that 
increase net social welfare.80 
B.  “Moral Rights” Theories 
By contrast, “moral rights” theories of copyright rely on deonto-
logical justifications.81  The Lockean “labor theory” holds that cop-
 
 75. A “market failure” is an economic inefficiency in the allocation of a good, and “free 
riding” is the ability to consume a good without paying the marginal cost of production. 
 76. See generally CASS & HYLTON, supra note 20. 
 77. Id. at 78. 
 78. See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 257 (2007). 
 79. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive 
Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 229 (2014); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright 
as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV 141; 
Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443–44 
(2010). 
 80. See, e.g., Bracha & Syed, supra note 79, at 229; Fromer, supra note 79, at 1443–44.
  
 81. See generally, Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000), availa-
ble at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1600book.pdf; William W. Fisher III,  Theories of Intellec-
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yright is justified because people have a natural right to own the 
fruits of their labor.82  By contrast, the Hegelian and Kantian 
“personality theories” hold that copyright is justified because a 
work of authorship is an expression of the personality of its au-
thor, and people are entitled to exercise control over themselves by 
exercising control over their expressions.83 
C.  Assumptions of This Article 
This article makes three assumptions.  First, it assumes that 
consequentialism is a true moral theory.  In other words, it ac-
cepts that an act or omission is justified if it produces a good out-
come, and not justified if it produces a bad outcome.84  By exten-
sion, it assumes that the deontological moral theories are not true 
moral theories. 
While the prevailing theories of copyright are the consequential-
ist economic and utilitarian theories, some scholars advocate ver-
sions of the deontological “moral rights” theories.85  Scholars disa-
gree about whether the consequentialist and deontological theo-
ries are compatible.  Some assume that they are.86  But others dis-
agree.  Notably, some consequentialists have argued that the 
“moral rights” theories of copyright are incompatible with conse-
quentialism and reduce to question begging.87  And some deontol-
ogists have adopted “moral rights” theories at least in part be-
 
tual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen 
Munzer ed., 2001). 
 82. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–83 
(1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 
(1988). 
 83. See Menell, supra note 81, at 156–63 (outlining the labor and personhood theories, 
among others); see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2011) (providing a more detailed account of the Lockean and Kantian theories of intellec-
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 84. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., 2003). 
 85. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 83. 
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 87. See, e.g, Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 
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Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 
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tary); Brian L. Frye, Machiavellian Intellectual Property, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 
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cause they believe that the current scope and duration of copy-
right is inconsistent with consequentialism.88 
Second, this article assumes that the economic theory of copy-
right is correct and explains the justification for copyright.  In any 
case, it is strongly implied by the Intellectual Property Clause, 
which authorizes Congress to create copyright protection in order 
to “promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience.”89  The Supreme Court has 
uniformly held that the Intellectual Property Clause relies on an 
economic theory of justification: “The economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights 
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”90 
Third, this article accepts that copyright is currently consistent 
with the economic theory.  This proposition is considerably more 
controversial.  Many scholars have argued that the duration of 
copyright protection is inconsistent with the economic theory be-
cause it continues long after most works of authorship have lost 
all economic value.91  Others have argued that the scope of copy-
right protection is too broad because it covers many uses of copy-
righted works that do not affect the incentives or legitimate eco-
nomic interests of their owners.92  Still others have argued that 
copyright protection is broadly unjustified because it does not pro-
vide a salient incentive to many authors.93 
In light of these empirical criticisms of the justification of copy-
right protection under the economic theory, we should be chary of 
further expanding the scope of intellectual property rights in 
works of authorship.  In particular, we should consider whether 
social norms that effectively create additional extra-legal intellec-
tual property rights in works of authorship are justified under the 
economic theory, before endorsing their legitimacy. 
Essentially, this article assumes that the economic theory of 
copyright is true, and asks whether plagiarism norms that prohib-
it non-copyright infringing plagiarism are justified under the eco-
nomic theory.  If you reject the economic theory of copyright, and 
in particular if you accept a “moral rights” theory of copyright, you 
reject the premises of this article, and consequently will not find 
 
 88. See generally MERGES, supra note 83. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 90. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 91. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242–45 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 92. See generally WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT (2012). 
 93. See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015). 
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its conclusions compelling.  But if you accept the economic theory 
of copyright, this article argues that you should reject plagiarism 
norms that prohibit non-copyright infringing plagiarism. 
VII.  THEORIES OF PLAGIARISM 
Surprisingly, there is no prevailing theory of plagiarism.  While 
innumerable scholars have studied plagiarism, the overwhelming 
majority has focused on its prevention.  Passing few have asked 
whether and why plagiarism norms are justified.  As a conse-
quence, plagiarism is woefully under-theorized, and the justifica-
tion for plagiarism norms is unclear. 
This article surveys the various theories of plagiarism.  In the 
interest of brevity and clarity, it focuses on academic plagiarism 
norms, which are both expansive and paradigmatic.  It begins by 
identifying the inchoate theory of plagiarism embedded in aca-
demic plagiarism norms.  Of necessity, it takes a forensic, or 
“trouble-case” approach to this inquiry, considering a series of ex-
amples and identifying the rationale for their resolution.94  Next, 
it considers the handful of theories of plagiarism advanced by 
scholars.  Finally, it asks whether any of those theories of plagia-
rism are consistent with the economic theory of copyright. 
A. Colloquial Theories of Plagiarism 
Colloquial theories of plagiarism typically define it as a form of 
“literary theft.”95  From this definition, it follows inexorably that 
plagiarism norms are justified as a method of preventing such 
“theft”: 
The synonyms that usually accompany the term plagiarism 
are both many and lurid: larceny, piracy, pilfering, stealing, 
purloining, robbery, thievery, even kleptomania.  The term 
acts as an adhesive incendiary that spreads a poisonous mist.  
There is almost no end to the inventory of felonious parallels 
that the literary and scholarly worlds have fashioned to pro-
tect their interests.96 
 
 94. Cf. KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN & EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE 
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941). 
 95.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 41, at 11; ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 51, 61; THOMAS 
MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF PLAGIARISM 99 
(1989). 
 96.  ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 61. 
154 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54 
But we should be wary of such intellectual property metaphors, 
as they are prone to lead us astray.97  We should “not permit ana-
logical reasoning to allow guilt by metaphor.”98  What does the 
plagiarist “steal”?  What is the nature of the “property” that pla-
giarism norms protect?  It is not physical property.  A plagiarist 
does not steal books; or rather, stealing books does not make one a 
plagiarist: 
This lexicon of loaded words is intended to inhibit the timid, 
intimidate the brash, and punish the perpetrators.  In fact, 
the intellectual world has itself purloined the entire vocabu-
lary of theft to characterize literary stealing, which is the ul-
timate in intellectual laziness.  It is disconcerting that so lit-
tle effort has been made to get behind the surface features of 
plagiarism.99 
Plagiarism is “theft” only in the sense that the plagiarist copies 
something from a work of authorship created by someone else.  
But a plagiarist’s copying may be quite attenuated.  A plagiarist 
need not copy an entire work, or even a single word from a work.  
Academic plagiarism norms prohibit copying even ideas. 
The essence of plagiarism is copying without attribution.  The 
plagiarist “steals” an author’s attribution right by using some el-
ement of a work of authorship without attribution.  But why is the 
attribution right justified, when is an attribution right justified, 
and how is an attribution right “stolen”? 
Plagiarism norms typically take the justification of the attribu-
tion right for granted.  Today, the overwhelming majority of peo-
ple simply assume that authors are entitled to an attribution 
right.  Thomas Mallon’s best-selling “history of plagiarism,” Stolen 
Words, exemplifies this attitude: 
I was, through my research, eventually, and much more than 
I expected to be, appalled: by the victims I learned of, by the 
audacity of their predators, by the excuses made for the lat-
ter.  The inability of the literary and academic worlds ade-
quately to define, much less reasonably punish, instances of 
plagiarism was something I observed again and again.  Our 
thinking on the subject, I realized, is primitive, and our fear 
of dealing with plagiarism when it’s just been discovered—as 
 
 97. See generally Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 (2015). 
 98. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 62. 
 99. ST. ONGE, supra note 42, at 61. 
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opposed to recollected from schooldays or literary history—
leads us into bungling and injustice.100 
So, Mallon is “appalled” by plagiarism and “appalled” that any-
one would question the legitimacy of plagiarism norms.101  Never 
mind that his own book documents the emergence of modern pla-
giarism norms in the early 19th century, prior to which imitation 
was not merely tolerated, but expected—if not required.102 
Many of the anecdotes favored by colloquial accounts of plagia-
rism illustrate the incoherence of academic plagiarism norms.  For 
example, Mallon rather gleefully recounts an incident in which the 
plagiarism policy in the University of Oregon student handbook 
was copied verbatim from a Stanford University student hand-
book.103 
Initially, the irony of a plagiarized plagiarism policy is delicious.  
But on reflection, the objection seems insubstantial, or even ab-
surd.  The purpose of a plagiarism policy is to define plagiarism 
and explain how to avoid it.  Plagiarism policies are not intended 
to present original ideas or expressions.  In fact, they affirmatively 
should not present original ideas or expressions.  If the Stanford 
plagiarism policy accurately defined plagiarism and correctly ex-
plained how to avoid it, there was no reason for the University of 
Oregon to change it.  Indeed, the only good reason for the Univer-
sity of Oregon to change the Stanford policy would be to improve 
its clarity or correct an error.  In other words, putative criticisms 
of the University of Oregon’s supposed plagiarism ultimately ex-
pose the incoherence of the very plagiarism norms it allegedly vio-
lated. 
By way of analogy, a plagiarism policy is like a statute.  When a 
legislature adopts a uniform statute or copies a statute enacted in 
another jurisdiction, plagiarism is not a coherent objection.  The 
authorship of a statute is irrelevant to its purpose, so attribution 
is pointless and meaningless.  Statutes are meant to be copied.  
Indeed, people typically object to unnecessary changes or amend-
ments, because they reduce uniformity across jurisdictions. 
What explains this reflexive extension of plagiarism norms to 
circumstances where they make no sense, even on their own 
terms?  Perhaps it is a function of their ubiquity, the stigma at-
tached to their violation, and the taboo against questioning their 
 
 100. MALLON, supra note 95, at xii. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 1–40. 
 103. Id. at 100. 
156 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54 
justification.104  Regardless, it is somewhat surprising, given that 
the attribution right created by plagiarism norms is a rather novel 
development, and even today is observed largely in the breach.  
While some social groups adopt strong plagiarism norms, many 
adopt none at all.  Presumably, the “decision” whether to adopt 
plagiarism norms is driven by game theoretical considerations 
intrinsic to a social group: If the members of a social group value 
attribution, then the group is likely to adopt internal plagiarism 
norms.105  However, that does not necessarily mean that the pla-
giarism norms adopted are justified under the economic theory.106 
At the very end of his book, Mallon does offer a cursory econom-
ic justification of plagiarism norms: 
So why don’t we give up worrying about an offense that leaves 
many of us feeling amused or ambivalent?  Because ceasing to 
care about plagiarism would not mean that writers had expe-
rienced a rise in wisdom and generosity; it would mean that 
they had permitted themselves a loss of self-respect.  And if 
ego stopped mattering, then, very likely, writers would stop 
writing—or at least stop writing so frequently and well.  
Which means that, finally, plagiarism would be a crime 
against the reader.107 
David Nimmer has offered a similar, but slightly narrower eco-
nomic justification of academic plagiarism norms: 
At base, the different currency of the Academy accounts for 
the different regime that should govern it.  The laws of the 
marketplace are ill served by allowing authors who no longer 
enjoy copyright protection to assert ersatz ownership through 
the vehicle of reverse passing off.  The marketplace operates 
through the lifeblood of sales volume and mass circulation.  
The Academy operates on a different currency, namely proper 
attribution.  Scholarly articles are not composed in order to 
generate author royalties and thereby amortize costs over the 
projected life of the copyright with an allowance for the neces-
sary profits in order to warrant the initial investment in pub-
lishing them.  Rather, the entire incentive for their creation is 
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(from the celestial perspective) to advance the frontiers of 
human knowledge and (from the earthly vantage) to win their 
authors recognition.  The right of attribution here is not an 
afterthought that threatens to skew the basic incentives; in 
the academic context, it IS the incentive (or a large part of it), 
which therefore must enjoy protection for the enterprise to 
continue sensibly.  “Citing is paying” in this environment.  
Here, derogation of moral rights, which elsewhere mean 
something other than morality, attests to a defect in moral 
character.108 
Both Mallon and Nimmer argue that plagiarism norms are jus-
tified under the economic theory because the attribution right 
provides an incentive that encourages marginal authors to invest 
in the production of works of authorship, and suggest that copy-
right incentives are inadequate.  Of course, that is an empirical 
hypothesis based entirely on speculation.  Moreover, even if one 
assumes that the attribution right is necessary in order to solve 
market failures in works of authorship, there is no reason to think 
that the de facto attribution right created by copyright is not en-
tirely adequate. 
While copyright creates only very limited and contingent explic-
it attribution rights, in practice it enables authors to exert an at-
tribution right over the original elements of their works of author-
ship, by enabling them to refuse permission to use those elements 
without attribution.  Copyright implicitly assumes that authors 
are rational economic actors, and that attribution has an economic 
value.  Indeed, the “work-made-for-hire” doctrine explicitly pro-
vides that authors can contract away their rights, including the 
implied right to claim attribution.  Moreover, the de facto attribu-
tion right created by copyright lasts for the entire copyright term, 
typically the life of the author and for 70 years after the author’s 
death.109 
It follows that the attribution right created by plagiarism norms 
is only necessary to prevent unattributed uses of the uncopyright-
able elements of a work, such as short phrases, facts, and ideas.  
But copyright explicitly deems protection of those elements unnec-
essary and unjustified. 
Moreover, in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation,110 the Supreme Court unanimously and explicitly 
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held that trademark law cannot prevent “reverse passing off” of a 
public domain work—a euphemism for unattributed copying or 
“plagiarism”—because the Copyright Act does not require attribu-
tion of public domain works.111  The Court held that “reading § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act as creating a cause of action for, in effect, 
plagiarism—the use of otherwise unprotected works and inven-
tions without attribution—would be hard to reconcile with our 
previous decisions.”112  In other words, plagiarism is not a crime, 
at least if the plagiarized elements are in the public domain and 
not protected by copyright. 
Colloquial theories of plagiarism implicitly claim that plagia-
rism norms are justified under the economic theory because au-
thors would choose not to produce works of authorship if they 
could not insist on the attribution of facts and ideas, as well as 
original expressions.  But this proposition is both implausible and 
never meaningfully defended.  Indeed, most non-academic authors 
correctly assume that facts and ideas are free to use, and yet the 
discovery of facts and generation of ideas continues apace.  Pre-
sumably, authors would relish attribution rights in facts and ide-
as, but colloquial theories of plagiarism provide no credible eco-
nomic justification for creating such rights. 
Of course, colloquial theories of plagiarism actually rely on de-
ontological justifications, primarily some version of the Hegelian 
or Kantian personality theories.  For example, Mallon observes: 
No, it isn’t murder.  But like murder it intrigues us at a com-
fortable remove, when we’re out of the line of fire and have 
been excused from the jury.  Think how often, after all, a 
writer’s books are called his or her children.  To see the writ-
er’s words kidnapped, to find them imprisoned, like change-
lings, on someone else’s equally permanent page, is to become 
vicariously absorbed by violation.113 
This congeries of metaphors illuminates only the extent to 
which Mallon channels the popular understanding of works of au-
thorship as an author’s progeny.114  Parents are proud of their 
children and want to be associated with them.  All the more so in 
the case of metaphorical children-like works of authorship, which 
are so much more malleable and tractable.  Likewise, Nimmer 
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immediately follows his nominal economic justification for aca-
demic plagiarism with a moral justification, replete with intellec-
tual property metaphors: 
This distinction also explains why the academic tort of plagia-
rism arises independently of copyright subsistence.  Whether 
a scholar in 2004 dishonestly attaches his name to writings of 
the distant past or of last week, the offense does not differ in 
kind.  In either event, he is polluting the cognitive well and 
disgracing his professional obligations by claiming credit 
where it is not due.  Plagiarism goes to the heart of the aca-
demic enterprise in a way that reverse passing off cannot af-
fect the commercial marketplace.  For that reason, plagiarism 
is and should remain a serious dereliction pursuant to the 
“House Rules” that govern in the university setting.115 
Colloquial theories of copyright typically assume that the at-
tribution right created by plagiarism norms is justified because a 
work of authorship is an expression of the personality of its au-
thor, and authors have a right to claim ownership of expressions of 
their personality.  This personality-based right does not extend 
only to the elements of a work that are protected by copyright, but 
to any element of a work valued by its author.  Accordingly, if col-
loquial theories of plagiarism present an accurate account of the 
rationale for the development of plagiarism norms, they suggest 
that plagiarism norms express moral sentiments relating to the 
ownership of ideas, rather than an effort to increase economic effi-
ciency. 
B. Fraud Theories of Plagiarism 
Alternative theories of plagiarism hold that plagiarism norms 
are justified because they prohibit a form of “academic fraud.”  For 
example, St. Onge argues that academic plagiarism norms are 
vague and overbroad, and offers a narrower definition of culpable 
plagiarism: 
Plagiarism is an intentional verbal fraud committed by the 
psychologically competent that consists of copying significant 
and substantial uncredited written materials for unearned 
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advantages with no significant enhancement of the materials 
copied.116 
If “fraud” means “illicit gains by illicit methods,” then we must 
distinguish between “plagiarism pure,” which reflects an intention 
to commit fraud, and “plagiarism impure, mitigated, extenuated, 
marginal, hapless, ignorant, careless, etc.”117  The culpable plagia-
rist intends to deceive in order to obtain an improper benefit; the 
innocent plagiarist does not. 
Notably, St. Onge’s fraud theory of plagiarism seems to exclude 
many forms of unattributed copying prohibited by academic pla-
giarism norms.  On its face, it appears to permit unattributed cop-
ying of ideas, which are not “written materials,” but abstractions.  
And it arguably permits unattributed copying of facts. 
But if plagiarism is defined as “copying significant and substan-
tial uncredited written materials,” plagiarism becomes almost in-
distinguishable from copyright infringement.118  Further, this 
fraud theory of plagiarism even seems to include a “fair use” ex-
ception, by requiring “unearned advantages with no significant 
enhancement of the materials copied.”119  By implication, “copying 
significant and substantial uncredited written materials” is not 
culpable plagiarism if the copier earns any advantage by signifi-
cantly enhancing the materials copied.  This proposition seems 
like a rephrasing of the copyright doctrine of transformative fair 
use, which permits otherwise infringing uses that add value to the 
original.120  Indeed, under this this fraud theory of plagiarism, the 
only difference between copyright infringement and plagiarism is 
that copyright effectively prohibits unattributed copying for the 
life of the artist plus seventy years, and plagiarism norms prohibit 
unattributed copying forever. 
C. Economic Theories of Plagiarism 
As discussed above, colloquial theories of plagiarism have occa-
sionally advanced cursory economic justifications for plagiarism 
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norms.  But those putative economic justifications merely obscure 
the fact that colloquial theories of plagiarism are really moral the-
ories, in a Hegelian or Kantian mold.  While colloquial theories of 
plagiarism may advance nominal economic justifications for pla-
giarism norms derived from copyright, their force depends on 
moral arguments. 
However, Judge Posner, rather unsurprisingly, advanced an ex-
plicitly economic theory of plagiarism in his amusing 2007 best 
seller The Little Book of Plagiarism.121  Essentially, he argues that 
academic plagiarism norms are justified because they prevent “ac-
ademic fraud” and encourage the production of original works of 
authorship. 
Posner begins by arguing that plagiarism is a form of concealed 
copying and that plagiarism norms are justified because plagia-
rism is a form of academic fraud that harms both consumers and 
producers: 
Plagiarism is a species of intellectual fraud.  It consists of un-
authorized copying that the copier claims (whether explicitly 
or implicitly, and whether deliberately or carelessly) is origi-
nal with him and the claim causes the copier’s audience to 
behave otherwise than it would if it knew the truth.  This 
change in behavior, as when it takes the form of readers’ buy-
ing the copier’s book under the misapprehension that it is 
original, can harm both the person who is copied and the 
competitors of the copier.122 
In other words, Posner argues that plagiarism defrauds con-
sumers by inducing detrimental reliance, and defrauds producers 
by enabling unfair competition.  But are either of these claims cor-
rect?  Does plagiarism induce detrimental reliance, and if so, why 
is it detrimental?  Does plagiarism enable unfair competition, and 
if so, why is it unfair?  Or rather, is Posner correct that plagiarism 
is a form of fraud? 
VIII. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
Posner argues that academic plagiarism norms are justified be-
cause plagiarism defrauds consumers by inducing detrimental re-
liance: “A judgment of plagiarism requires that the copying, be-
sides being deceitful in the sense of misleading the intended read-
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ers, induce reliance by them.”123  In other words, plagiarism de-
frauds consumers by inducing them to rely on the representation 
that a work is original and not plagiarized.  One illustration of 
this theory provides that “[h]e buys a book that he wouldn’t have 
bought had he known it contained large swatches of another writ-
er’s book; he would have bought that other writer’s book in-
stead.”124 
Nevertheless, Posner’s argument that plagiarism defrauds con-
sumers by inducing detrimental reliance is entirely circular.  Con-
sumers assume that an unattributed work is original and not cop-
ied only because academic plagiarism norms prohibit unattributed 
copying.  It is passing strange to argue that academic plagiarism 
norms are justified because they induce consumer reliance.  In the 
absence of plagiarism norms inducing reliance, there is no reason 
to assume that consumers would care about attribution.  On the 
contrary, consumers would presumably not expect attribution, and 
would not be misled by a lack of attribution. 
Indeed, when social groups adopt different plagiarism norms, 
consumers make different assumptions.  For example, in practice 
journalistic plagiarism norms typically prohibit copying expres-
sions without attribution, but permit copying ideas without at-
tribution. 125  As a consequence, consumers assume the unat-
tributed expressions in a journalistic work originated with the au-
thor, but do not assume the unattributed ideas originated with the 
author.  In other words, plagiarism is “detrimental” to consumers 
only because and to the extent that plagiarism norms induce con-
sumer reliance in the first place. 
Moreover, in the absence of academic plagiarism norms, plagia-
rism may benefit consumers.  Copying expressions and ideas is 
cheaper than creating new expressions and ideas.  Accordingly, 
copying enables authors to produce new works of authorship more 
cheaply, by investing their resources in the creation of new ex-
pressions and ideas, rather than recasting existing expressions 
and ideas. 
In addition, the attribution of expressions and ideas does not 
necessarily benefit consumers.  In some cases, attribution provides 
valuable information, but in many cases it does not.  Law reviews 
typically require the attribution of every non-original claim in an 
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article.126  All too often, the claims in question are trivial, common 
sense, or common knowledge in the field.127  Attribution of such 
claims burdens consumers by encouraging them to consult unhelp-
ful sources.  One might just as well argue that academic plagia-
rism norms are unjustified because they induce consumer reliance 
without benefiting consumers. 
IX. UNFAIR COMPETITION 
Posner also argues that academic plagiarism norms are justified 
because plagiarism defrauds producers by enabling unfair compe-
tition: “[C]ompetitive harm is a significant consequence of plagia-
rism.  The plagiarist by plagiarizing improves his work relative to 
that of his competitors and so increases his sales and fame rela-
tive to theirs.”128  In other words, plagiarism harms producers by 
enabling plagiarists to unfairly compete with non-plagiarists.  
Further, Posner explicitly analogizes plagiarism to trademark in-
fringement: “Trademark infringement in the market for ordinary 
goods corresponds to plagiarism in the market for expressive 
goods.”129 
However, Posner’s analogy fails because non-infringing plagia-
rism does not correspond to trademark infringement in any way.  
Trademark law prevents consumer confusion regarding the origin 
of a product by prohibiting the use of protected marks, but it does 
not prevent competitors from producing similar products.  Like-
wise, copyright law effectively prevents consumer confusion about 
the origin of a work of authorship by prohibiting competitors from 
copying certain original elements of a work of authorship in cer-
tain circumstances, but it does not prevent competitors from pro-
ducing similar products. 
Thus, plagiarism corresponds to trademark infringement only to 
the extent that plagiarism norms prohibit illegitimate copying of 
certain elements of a work.  Conversely, plagiarism norms that 
prohibit non-infringing plagiarism explicitly prohibit legitimate 
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copying of facts and ideas, a kind of copying that is expressly per-
mitted by the Copyright Act and protected by the Constitution.130  
Indeed, Posner himself recognizes that academic plagiarism norms 
that prohibit the “plagiarism of ideas” may harm the public inter-
est by reducing the dissemination of ideas.131 
In other words, plagiarism norms that prohibit non-infringing 
plagiarism prevent competition.  But it is important to note that 
these norms prohibit fair competition, not unfair competition.  
Copyright law and the Constitution expressly exclude facts and 
ideas from copyright protection because such protection is contra-
ry to public interest.  Or, rather, copyright law expressly permits 
the copying of facts and ideas, with or without attribution, because 
it promotes competition and the public interest. 
X. UNCONSCIOUS MORAL OBJECTIONS 
Tellingly, even Posner’s ostensibly economic justification of aca-
demic plagiarism norms frequently lapses into moral justifica-
tions.  To illustrate, Posner’s primary example is the case of Kaa-
vya Viswanathan, a Harvard student who was accused of plagia-
rism when it was discovered that many passages from her young 
adult novel, How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a 
Life, closely resembled passages from Megan McCafferty’s popular 
young adult novels, Sloppy Firsts and Second Helpings, among 
other books.132  In the wake of the ensuing scandal, Viswanathan’s 
publisher recalled her novel and cancelled her contract. 
Posner condemns Viswanathan’s plagiarism as the equivalent of 
trademark infringement: “What Viswanathan did was no less—
though maybe no more—reprehensible than what a manufacturer 
of toothpaste would be doing if he slapped the name of a better-
known brand on his toothpaste, even if his toothpaste was equal in 
quality to that of the other brand.”133  A person who intentionally 
creates and sells counterfeit goods violates criminal trademark 
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law by intentionally misleading consumers about the source of the 
goods.  By contrast, Viswanathan did not violate any criminal law, 
and her conduct probably did not even amount to copyright in-
fringement.  Yes, she copied ideas and short phrases without at-
tribution, but copyright law expressly permits that.  If her actions 
were “reprehensible,” it is only because they violate academic pla-
giarism norms, not because they were crimes or torts.  But if her 
acts were neither crimes nor torts, why are they “reprehensible”?  
Only because Posner believes that violating academic plagiarism 
norms is a moral wrong. 
Even more telling is Posner’s claim that copying without attrib-
ution cannot be a fair use: 
But the fair user is assumed to use quotation marks and cred-
it the source; he is not a plagiarist.  I thus disagree that there 
can be “fair use” when the copier is passing off the copied pas-
sage as his own.  The fair-use right is an exception to copy-
right, which normally prohibits the unauthorized publication 
of copyrighted work, and why should the exception shelter 
plagiarists?  The plagiarist does not play fair.  Were there 
such an exception, one could write a book consisting entirely 
of unacknowledged passages from other writers, provided one 
only took a small amount from each work; in fact it would be 
a case of both plagiarism and copyright infringement.134 
This passage is remarkable because Posner’s assertion is plainly 
wrong.  The Copyright Act protects the original elements of a work 
of authorship, and the fair use doctrine permits the unauthorized 
use of original elements of a copyrighted work under certain cir-
cumstances.135  But neither requires attribution.  In fact, the Cop-
yright Act only mentions attribution in relation to certain works of 
visual art.136  In other words, attribution is irrelevant to fair use.  
Posner objects to his hypothetical quote-novel not because it in-
fringes, but because it plagiarizes; or, rather, because the copying 
novelist “does not play fair.”  This is not an economic objection, but 
a moral one.  An author who creates a new work of authorship 
composed entirely out of quotes increases economic welfare by cre-
ating a social benefit with no social harm.  Any objection is neces-
sarily based on an attribution right that copyright does not pro-
vide. 
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Notably, Posner’s “hypothetical” is not hypothetical at all.  The 
celebrated post-modernist Kenneth Goldsmith has created many 
works by copying pre-existing works, in part or in whole, often 
without explicit attribution.137  The Austrian–American author 
Walter Abish’s book 99: The New Meaning is a collection of stories 
that consist entirely of unattributed quotations.138  And Jonathan 
Lethem’s brilliant essay The Ecstasy of Influence: A Plagiarism, 
consists largely of unattributed quotations, albeit with an accom-
panying key.139 
Significantly, while Posner defends the legitimacy of academic 
plagiarism norms, he opposes their enforcement through the legal 
system, favoring informal sanctions for an assortment of rea-
sons.140  As he observes: “Plagiarism is thus the kind of wrongdo-
ing best left to informal, private sanctions.”141  One might wonder 
whether many forms of so-called “plagiarism” are a kind of 
“wrongdoing” at all. 
XI. THE JUSTIFICATION OF ACADEMIC PLAGIARISM NORMS 
In light of these observations, I conclude that academic plagia-
rism norms prohibiting non-copyright infringing plagiarism are 
not justified under the economic theory of copyright.  Academic 
plagiarism norms prohibit unattributed copying of expressions, 
facts, and ideas.  To the extent that they prohibit non-copyright 
infringing copying, they create an extra-legal attribution right in 
expressions, facts, and ideas.  In other words, academic plagiarism 
norms reflect the desire of a particular social group to create an 
extra-legal attribution right in expressions, facts, and ideas that 
the Supreme Court has expressly held unconstitutional.142 
A. Academic Plagiarism Norms Affecting Scholars 
Defenders of academic plagiarism norms have offered many ex-
plicit and implicit theoretical justifications for the attribution 
right they create.  As explained above, the moral justifications for 
academic plagiarism norms are non-responsive to the economic 
theory of copyright, and the putative economic justifications are 
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not compelling.  To the extent that the attribution right created by 
academic plagiarism norms exceeds the constitutional scope of 
copyright protection, it is unlikely to provide a salient incentive to 
marginal authors.  If the public feels “defrauded” by non-copyright 
infringing plagiarism at all, it is only because academic plagiarism 
norms exist in the first place.  And non-copyright infringing pla-
giarism is “unfair” only because academic plagiarism norms say it 
is. 
The only plausible economic justification for academic plagia-
rism norms that prohibit non-copyright infringing plagiarism is 
that attribution benefits the public by substantiating factual 
claims and providing bibliographical references.  Clearly, attribu-
tion often provides valuable information and thereby increases 
public welfare.  But not always. Sometimes, the attribution of ex-
pressions, facts, or ideas is cumbersome and unhelpful.  Attribu-
tion of clichéd phrases, popular expressions, or formulaic state-
ments is often unhelpful.  As the copyright merger doctrine recog-
nizes, when an idea can only be expressed in a limited number of 
ways, the expression of that idea cannot and should not be pro-
tected by copyright.143  Attribution of facts is often unhelpful, es-
pecially when they are attributed to secondary sources that nei-
ther meaningfully substantiate the facts in question, nor provide 
any additional information.  And attribution of ideas is often un-
helpful, especially when the original expression of the idea was 
poorly executed or the idea itself has become commonplace. 
Of course, it does not follow that the attribution of expressions, 
facts, and ideas is wrong.  On the contrary, authors should feel an 
obligation to attribute any expressions, facts, and ideas they copy, 
to the extent that doing so provides a public benefit.  But, at least 
on their face, academic plagiarism norms not only create a moral 
obligation to attribute expressions, facts, and ideas when it pro-
vides a public benefit, but also when it does not.  Or, to put it an-
other way, academic plagiarism norms implicitly create an extra-
legal right to require the attribution of expressions, facts, and ide-
as, which is effectively enforced by the academy irrespective of the 
original author’s wishes. 
In other words, academic plagiarism norms do not just encour-
age socially beneficial attribution, they require attribution irre-
spective of its effect on social welfare.  Often, the mandatory at-
tribution of expressions, facts, and ideas imposes costs that exceed 
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any social benefit.  As observed above, while attribution is often 
helpful, sometimes it is unhelpful.  When a mandatory but unhelp-
ful attribution causes a reader to obtain and review the unhelpful 
source, it imposes a social cost. 
Mandatory attribution may also create inefficient incentives for 
authors.  Given the choice between investigating an idea that re-
quires an unhelpful attribution and an idea that requires no at-
tribution, authors have an incentive to pursue the latter, even if 
the former would provide a larger public benefit.  To put it another 
way, academic plagiarism norms create an incentive for scholars 
to choose novelty over value.  At least in theory, it is better to be 
the first to express an idea than the first to express it well. 
Moreover, even if the net social cost imposed by academic pla-
giarism norms is low, the individual cost is high.  A scholar ac-
cused of plagiarism incurs substantial personal and reputational 
costs, even if the charge is not proven.  And if a plagiarism charge 
is proven, a scholar may be punished, or even pushed out of the 
academy, even if the plagiarism in question consists of as dubious 
a wrong as copying facts or ideas without attribution. 
In addition, the social value generated by the mandatory attrib-
ution right created by academic plagiarism norms may have been 
superseded by technology.  Historically, the mandatory attribution 
right ensured that scholars would provide references for all of 
their non-original claims.  But it did not create any guarantee that 
scholars would provide the most helpful reference, or that refer-
ences would be helpful at all.  Today, “digital humanities” data-
bases can automatically provide suggested references for any text, 
obviating the need for burdensome and often unhelpful cita-
tions.144  Automatically generated references should be preferable 
to the attribution mandated by academic plagiarism norms, be-
cause they will prioritize impact over novelty.  In other words, 
readers are directed to the most useful source addressing an idea, 
rather than the first source to address the idea. 
The preceding observations suggest that academic plagiarism 
norms are intended to solve the academy’s internal coordination 
problems, not in order to benefit the public.  “People despise pla-
giarism not because it results in inferior works—by drawing from 
others plagiarists may produce better works than they could by 
themselves—but because it is a form of cheating that allows the 
plagiarist an unearned benefit.”145 
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Of course, one might believe that social groups ought to be enti-
tled to enforce internal social norms, so long as they do not violate 
any legal prohibitions.146  As many scholars have shown, custom-
ary property rules sometimes provide an efficient way of manag-
ing scarcity and solving the tragedy of the commons.147  But there 
is no prima facie reason to believe that customary property rules, 
developed to manage public goods, also correlate with efficiency.  
On the contrary, they are often associated with cartelization and 
rent-seeking.148 
Scholars typically participate in an academic gift economy.  Typ-
ically, they do not expect to receive direct compensation for the 
production of scholarship, but, rather, receive indirect compensa-
tion in the form of promotion and prestige.149  But that does not 
mean that we should respect plagiarism norms as in the public 
interest.  Essentially, academic plagiarism norms are a form of 
private ordering intended to benefit insiders at the expense of out-
siders.  As Sayre observed: “Academic politics is the most vicious 
and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low.”150  
Likewise, plagiarism is pursued and punished most vigorously in 
the academic world because the economic stakes are so low.  The 
lower the economic value of a work of authorship, the more im-
portant the right of attribution. 
In sum, academic plagiarism norms are effectively a form of ex-
tra-legal rent-seeking.  Academics want comprehensive protection 
of the expressions, facts, and ideas they produce, which copyright 
law does not and cannot provide.  As a consequence, they rely on 
extra-legal, quasi-property interests created by academic plagia-
rism norms.  These interests are not justified under the economic 
theory because they benefit academics, rather than the public.  
Accordingly, they should not be respected. 
Notably, in practice, academic plagiarism norms are observed 
largely in the breach.  Studies of plagiarism routinely complain 
that prominent scholars accused of plagiarism typically receive 
only a slap on the wrist.151  When Stephen Ambrose, Doris Kearns 
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Goodwin, Charles Ogletree, Laurence Tribe and others were ac-
cused of plagiarism, they pleaded inadvertent error, and ultimate-
ly paid little or no cost.152  They were publicly embarrassed, but 
did not lost their jobs or careers.  Notably, they were accused of 
copying particular expressions without attribution, not just ideas.  
Less prominent scholars are typically less fortunate.  They may be 
dismissed, denied tenure, or even fired from tenured positions. 
Moreover, it is an open secret in the academy that certain prom-
inent academics are notorious “idea-stealers.”  When they attend 
conference and workshops, they collect interesting ideas expressed 
by others and quickly write their own articles addressing those 
ideas, without crediting the originator of the idea.  Scholars typi-
cally react to these idea-stealers in much the same way as stand-
up comedians react to joke-stealers: they avoid expressing novel 
ideas in the presence of known idea-stealers and use informal so-
cial sanctions like gossip to undermine the idea-stealers.153 
However, prominent idea-stealers are rarely, if ever, formally 
accused of plagiarism.  This suggests that the ostensible scope of 
academic plagiarism norms is exaggerated for effect, and that 
their actual scope is considerably narrower.  While academic pla-
giarism norms claim to prohibit the unattributed copying of ideas, 
in practice, it is difficult or impossible to make out a plagiarism 
claim for copying an idea, especially if the alleged plagiarist is a 
prominent scholar.  Nor is it consistent with academic freedom to 
permit such claims.154  Taken to the extreme, if academic plagia-
rism norms actually required the attribution of all previously ex-
pressed ideas, it would encourage scholars to publish lists of half-
baked ideas on the Internet, in order to claim ownership of them, 
rather than engage in actual scholarship.  In practice, scholars do 
not feel obligated to attribute unelaborated ideas, unless doing so 
is helpful to the reader, which suggests that the scope of academic 
plagiarism norms is narrower than claimed. 
B. Academic Plagiarism Norms Affecting Students 
While academic plagiarism norms that prohibit non-copyright 
infringing plagiarism are largely toothless when applied to schol-
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ars, they have profound consequences when applied to students.  
Students accused of plagiarism may receive a failing grade, be 
suspended from academic study, or even expelled.  As Posner ob-
serves, this probably reflects the comparative difficulty of identify-
ing plagiarism in published versus unpublished works, although 
automated plagiarism-detection services make the task considera-
bly easier.155 
However, even if one accepts the legitimacy of academic plagia-
rism norms as applied to scholars, it is not all clear that it makes 
sense to extend them to students.  Ultimately, the public purpose 
and ostensible justification of academic plagiarism norms is to en-
sure that the public receives complete and accurate information 
about the attribution of expressions, facts, and ideas.  To the ex-
tent that students are producing scholarship for public consump-
tion, it makes some sense that it should satisfy the same stand-
ards as work produced by professional scholars. 
But the overwhelming majority of students are not producing 
scholarship for public consumption.  They are completing assign-
ments that will be read by a professor or teaching assistant and 
then forgotten.  It makes no sense to apply academic plagiarism 
norms to such assignments, unless doing so will provide a peda-
gogical benefit.  And the evidence suggests the opposite. 
As Rebecca Moore Howard has observed, academic plagiarism 
norms prohibit certain forms of imitation that promote learning.156  
In particular, many students most effectively learn how to write 
by engaging in what Howard calls “patch writing,” or “copying 
from a source text and then deleting some words, altering gram-
matical structures, or plugging in one synonym for another.” 157  
As Howard observes, patch writing is a form of learning, not a 
form of cheating. 158  And to the extent that academic plagiarism 
norms prohibit and punish patch writing by students, they impose 
substantial social costs, by preventing students from engaging in 
pedagogically productive activities. 
It makes no sense to impose academic plagiarism norms on stu-
dents.  The purpose is learning, not the production of scholarship.  
The rules governing student work ought to be designed to prohibit 
cheating, not “plagiarism.”  In other words, students should be 
prohibited from engaging in practices that do not promote learn-
ing, and encouraged to engage in practices that do promote learn-
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ing.  When academic plagiarism norms are invoked to prohibit 
students from engaging in pedagogically productive activities like 
patch writing, they are misused on their own terms.  Moreover, 
they promote a deep cynicism in students, who are keenly attuned 
to the coherence and fairness of the rules that govern their ac-
tions.  Unthinkingly applying academic plagiarism norms to stu-
dents may even have the unintended effect of causing them to dis-
count the legitimacy of rules intended to prevent cheating, as well 
as irrelevant rules intended to prevent plagiarism. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Copyright infringement and plagiarism are related but distinct 
concepts.  Copyright prohibits certain uses of original works of 
authorship without permission, and plagiarism norms prohibit 
copying certain expressions, facts, and ideas without attribution.  
The prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which 
holds that copyright is justified because it is economically efficient.  
Likewise, plagiarism norms are justified only if they are economi-
cally efficient.  It appears that academic plagiarism norms prohib-
iting non-copyright infringing plagiarism are not efficient because 
they decrease social welfare, especially in relation to students.  
Accordingly, they are not justified. 
